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ABSTRACT 
Service implementation network engagement and its effects on the likelihood that 
organizations will engage in collaborative policy advocacy is studied. The research was 
based on a centrally governed mental health service network in Bernalillo County New 
Mexico. The study population consists of one for-profit network administrative 
organization (NAO) contracted by the state and 33 mental health service providers 
representing all three sectors. Based on earlier research, several hypotheses are developed 
regarding the roles of resource dependence, organizational embeddedness in cliques, and 
the bonding model of network organizing.    
The hypotheses are tested using multiple regression quadratic assignment 
procedure (MRQAP). The study generated two important findings. First, similar 
dependence on the NAO, based on service linkages, is found to be negatively related to 
policy advocacy. Second, those specific organizations who both share a clique with the 
NAO and who are similarly dependent upon the NAO find themselves to be more likely 
to engage in dyadic relations of policy advocacy.  
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Based on limited interview data, a qualitative analysis was undertaken. This 
analysis, more specifically, attempts to shine some light on the content of policy 
advocacy. The analysis finds that organizational decisions to engage in policy advocacy 
can be best understood from a bottom up approach starting with the development of 
social capital and understanding the dynamics of resource dependence in a centrally 
governed network. This analysis is followed up with a discussion, focusing on theoretical 
and practical implications and suggestions for further research.      
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Organizations tend to interact in several different ways exchanging information 
and resources in hierarchical and market arrangements (Powell 1990).  When 
organizational exchanges occur in a non-market and non-hierarchical manner their 
interaction tends to form a type of collective action (pg. 322). This type of collective 
action comes in the form of network exchanges where participants share in the resources 
devoted and the benefits received. The focus of collective action, in the literature, tends 
to be centered on network collaboration for knowledge and administrative purposes 
(Rethemeyer & Hatmaker , 2007; Owen-Smith & Powell , 2004; Alexander , 2000; 
Amirkhanyan, 2008) and policy advocacy (Varda, 2010; Kelleher & Yackee , 2008; 
Johns Hopkins University, 2008). For the purposes of this paper I will focus on two 
network types: first, networks owing their existence to the need to provide products or 
services, which are known as service implementation networks (Milward & Provan, 
2006); and second, networks created in the pursuit of policy change where the actors 
have a shared interest. These are known as policy networks (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, 
Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011).              
The various explanations for the existence of public sector networks relate to the 
need to resolve a wide array of administrative issues. These issues include the need for 
organizations to transfer knowledge (Provan & Contractor, 2008) the need to exploit 
relations in the race to innovate (Powell , 1998), and the need to garner resources 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005 ; Alexander , 2000). Other explanations describe inter-
organizational relations as a way to determine difficult policy issues or address the need 
to solve “wicked” problems (Rittel & Webber , 1973; O'Toole, 1997; Weber & 
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Khademian , 2008 ). Some of these networks, such as emergency management, are 
mandated to work together (Milward & Provan, 2006).These concepts are related to 
resource dependence theory and they attempt to describe interorganizational relations as a 
way for one organization to exploit the resources of other organizations. In the context of 
“wicked” problems, for example, organizations depend on other organizations’ resources, 
in a sense, to solve problems which are too big, complex, or boundary spanning.   
Both service implementation and policy network structures are based on dyadic 
(two connected actors) interactions commonly motivated by interdependences based on 
the overall network need to solve problems (managerial or policy). Furthermore, dyads in 
a network, formed by interorganizational dependences, may form webs of 
interdependence across network types. For example, relations that are garnered based on 
service implementation dependences may be related to, or lead to, dependences which are 
based on policy advocacy. Even though both types of interactions have been looked at 
through the lenses of resource dependence, social capital, and others; in the past, they 
have been researched independently of each other (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker , 2007). The 
major thrust of this thesis will be to gain an understanding of the relationship between 
networks formed for service implementation and their possible effect on the structure of 
networks formed for policy advocacy reasons within a network governed by a network 
administrative organization (NAO). In other words, this research will examine to what 
extent the structure of service implementation networks spill over into the structure of 
policy advocacy networks in a centrally governed network.   
This analysis is at the network level and is situated within the definition of a 
whole network which, according to Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) consists of three or 
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more organizations that formed to attain a common goal and are arranged in a mostly 
non-hierarchical way. Furhthermore, this research will focus on interactions between 
organizations in smaller network partitions; more specifically, cliques and can be defined 
as a group of three or more maximally connected actors. (Rowley, Greve, Rao, Baum, & 
Shipilov, 2005).   The boundaries of the network were determined by organizations in 
contractual relationships with the NAO in a health and human services network. This 
network, while organized formally, with contracts and institutionalized practices, may 
have substructures which are in and of themselves informal networks that are not bound 
through formal means. The network may have further divisions including network 
partitions or cliques which serve purposes that may or may not be entirely in line with the 
goals of the NAO. While the NAO and its network was created primarily for the purposes 
of managing and confronting a “wicked” problem, namely serious mental health, it is our 
proposition that network structures, which are present within the more formal NAO 
connected service implementation network, will be present within less formal network 
structures (i.e. in the absence of contractual arrangements) such as policy advocacy. 
Furthermore, service implementation network membership may play an important role in 
determining the likelihood that an organization will engage in collaborative policy 
advocacy.   
 For the most part, research examining relationships between different network 
structures, including policy advocacy, has been absent from public administration 
scholarship. Some exceptions to this were illustrated in an early review of literature on 
interorganizational relations (Galaskiewicz , 1985 ). This study stated that the problem of 
political mobilization leads researchers to find that “(a) organizations within political 
4 
 
coalitions tended to have interorganizational relations among themselves prior to 
coalition formulation and (b) the mobilization of individual organizations was often a 
function of their centrality in resource networks” (pg. 15). Galaskiewics review noted 
earlier research which found that coalition formulation was dependent upon internal 
linkages in the community, that preexisting structures lead to speedy issue response, and 
that centrality was a predictor of organizational mobilization. Most of these studies were 
egocentric and in other fields. This is why we are examining this topic from a “whole 
network” perspective in the frame of public administration scholarship.   
One major thrust of this research is to use statistical tools to answer questions 
regarding whether or not service implementation networks are related to policy networks. 
After asking whether or not these spillovers occur, and if we can say with confidence that 
they do, it will become important to begin to understand why they occur. Answering Isett 
et al. (2011)’s call for more practitioner engaged scholarship we begin to expand theory 
on why these structural spillovers occur using qualitative methods based on agency 
executive interviews. As Isett et al. stated (pg. 69) “theory strongly grounded in 
practitioners’ experience equals relevance”.  
The remainder of this thesis will discuss prior network research which has 
focused on policy advocacy networks, and will then discuss relevant research focusing on 
service implementation networking. These two streams of research have largely been 
considered in isolation of each other and I will seek to close this gap by showing 
statistical evidence that service implementation networking has a statistically significant 
relationship to policy advocacy. One of the weaknesses of this research is that we do not 
have longitudinal data which would be useful in determining whether one network 
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structure leads to another. The next section of this thesis and the later qualitative analysis 
(after the quantitative findings are presented) will attempt to correct for this by providing 
a theoretical backdrop including possibilities for how service implementation networks 
lead to policy networks. This will be followed by a presentation of hypotheses, an 
operationalization of the variables, and the methods section which will discuss our usage 
of multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) with double Dekkar 
semi-partialling. I will then present the findings of the quantitative section with analysis 
followed by the qualitative findings and analysis. I will conclude with a general 
discussion of the findings, attempt to fit these findings in the larger context, and finish 
with suggestions for further research.                
Policy Networks 
There are several different studies that focus on why and how organizations 
engage in policy advocacy. Mosley (2010), drawing from resource mobilization theory 
and resource dependence theory, commented that “organizations will become involved in 
advocacy if they have both incentives to do so and resources that provide the capacity to 
mobilize” (pg. 60). One of the resources organizations can draw from, as noted by 
Mosley, is the level of professionalization in an organization and its associated links with 
professional networks. Though useful this research is focused on independent policy 
advocacy not collaborative policy advocacy.  
Others (Kelleher & Yackee , 2008) have focused on organizational involvement 
in policy advocacy as, in some cases, being dependent on contact with government 
managers in the form of contract negotiation. The main thrust of their study showed that 
organizations which regularly contract with the government will have more opportunities 
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to influence government managers, and thus will be more effective in their policy 
advocacy/lobbying efforts. Few of the studies in this line of research have focused on the 
“whole network” when it comes to policy advocacy and instead have been egocentric. 
One notable exception to this is deLeon & Varda (2009) where the focus was on building 
a theoretical model which would help to explain the characteristics of policy advocacy 
networks. The thrust of their paper focused on describing policy advocacy networks 
based on properties present within the network such as diversity, reciprocity, power 
structure, embeddedness, trust, decision making, and leadership. 
Service implementation Networks 
Another stream of research focuses on organizations that join networks to deliver 
products and implement services collaboratively (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, & 
Rethemeyer, 2011). Early theories of organizational network engagement were based on 
extensions of the literature on interorganizational relations including transaction cost and 
resource dependence theory (Provan & Milward , 1995). For example, Galaskiewicz 
(1985) stated that “interorganizational relations take place in three arenas: resource 
procurement and allocation, political advocacy, and organizational legitimation. 
Likewise, Alexander (2000) affirmed that organizations were able to garner resources 
through their linkages. The linkages she cited include grants, contracts, donated 
professional services, referred clients, and media attention. These linkages can be 
fostered by clients, staff, and board members.  
Some of these earlier theories have been amended from their original versions 
with the integration of the network perspective. A case in point is Casciaro and 
Piskorski’s (2005) modification of resource dependence theory focusing on how power 
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imbalance, and mutual dependence effect constraint absorption (giving the rights to 
control resources to the dependent actor). Their findings were different from earlier 
studies since the authors’ analysis concentrated on dyadic relationships where earlier 
studies only looked at one side of the power structure. They found that the probability of 
engaging in constraint absorption operations, as measured by mergers, was negatively 
affected by power imbalances and that constraint was positively affected by mutual 
dependence. This raises the possibility, in the context of this study, of whether 
organizations are more likely to engage in network relationships, such as advocacy, if 
they share similar dependence in relation to the NAO. This may be especially true when 
the NAO is dominant and comes from the for-profit sector. Evidence related to this 
supposition can be found in Rowley et al. (2005) where they found a positive relationship 
between clique exit and size diversity. Expressly, large dependence differences between 
members within a clique led to clique exit.  
Borgatti and Halgin (2011)’s bonding theory emphasizes that groups of nodes can 
work together and in essence form a single node. They stated that organizations “by 
working together they can accomplish more than they could alone” (pg. 7). Organizations 
in this configuration can use the bonding ties between them to act as if they were 
transferring the capabilities of other nodes to each other. Organizations can use the 
solidarity ties to coordinate their power to extract better deals with a common negotiating 
partner. This is the logic behind “unionization”. Drawing from this theory we can expect 
organizations that are similarly situated in terms of their dependence on the NAO to have 
the tendency to bond together to counteract the power of the NAO. More expressly 
organizations that have similar dependence on the NAO may be more likely to engage in 
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dyadic relationships of policy advocacy finding the common need to counteract the 
power of the NAO. This leads me to posit the following hypothesis.     
H1: Similar dependence between organizations on an NAO within a centrally 
governed network will increase the likelihood of dyadic engagement in policy advocacy.  
Another area of research related to service implementation networks looks at the 
comparative advantages of network structure along with other types of organizational 
structure. O’Toole (1997) remarked on earlier research stating that hierarchical forms of 
administration can “push back” weaknesses that individuals have in the decision making 
process, converting these weaknesses into organizational strength. Part of arranging 
organizations in hierarchical form is to divide organizations into individual subunits with 
the focus on individual issue areas ignoring problems which lay outside of a subunit’s 
purview. The problem with this structure, as O’Toole commented, is that it does not take 
into account issues which are complex and not easily broken down into individual 
problem areas. Rittel and Webber (1973) called this a “wicked” problem because, as they 
stated, when it comes to complex public policy issues it makes no sense to talk about 
“optimal solutions”. The most recent authors discussing “wicked” problems (Weber & 
Khademian , 2008 ) made the point that complex issues can be best handled with 
management networks which are composed of a diverse set of actors who bring a wide 
spectrum of resources to bear on cross-cutting problem areas.  
This spectrum of diversity may include actors who carry resources outside the 
original resources the NAO sought when they initiated the network. Furthermore, 
partitions and cliques initiated in the original network may have incentives to carry on 
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with outside activities. For example, groups of organizations within the governance 
network with similar NAO dependencies may have the incentive to share the resources 
they have to garner the resources from the environment they need. Organizational 
obtainment of needed resources may require participation in collaborative policy 
advocacy. To put it another way, sub-structures initiated by the governance network may 
carry over to form advocacy networks.   
H2: Similar engagement in cliques with the NAO will result in a higher likelihood 
that organizations will engage in dyadic relationships of collaborative policy advocacy.   
H3: When two organizations are embedded in a service delivery clique that 
includes the NAO, similar dependence on the NAO will result in higher likelihood that 
these two organizations will engage in collaborative policy advocacy.   
 The propositions in H2 and H3 are directed at understanding whether prior similar 
engagements with the NAO will lead to policy advocacy or if there are other contributing 
factors such as similar dependence on the NAO. If the null hypothesis for hypothesis 2 
turns out to be true or if it is found that there is a negative relationship it will be 
interesting to gain further understanding of the content of the NAO’s engagement in 
network cliques. Likewise, if there is evidence supporting hypothesis 3 it will be 
interesting to gain a greater understanding of the underlying dynamics.      
 
10 
 
CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The two streams of research cited above have, for the most part, considered 
advocacy networks and service implementation networks separately. These streams have 
not looked at the reasons for engaging in policy advocacy networks as a direct affect of 
engagement in service implementation networks. If we contend that engagement in 
service implementation networks is related to other types of networking such as policy 
advocacy, then there is good reason to believe that networking of any kind between 
organizations will create potential structures of advocacy. Explicitly, it is not enough to 
ask whether one network type is related to another but we must also ask how and why 
this occurs. One possible reason for this is that organizations who engage in service 
implementation networks are likely to develop social capital. In other words, initial 
engagement in service implementation networks may lead to the development of trust, 
norms of reciprocity, and reputation (Powell , 1990) which are features of social 
organizations and are, furthermore, elements of social capital (Putnam, 1995). This 
capitol is likely spent on advocacy with service implementation network structures 
persisting, but may be organized informally or be partitioned with less connection to the 
NAO.  
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Figure 1 Theoretical model illustrating a service implementation network 
Error! Reference source not found.This network may build social capital and may lead to 
policy advocacy networks. Much of the service implementation structure remains intact. 
The transference of structure is most likely based on relationships of trust, reciprocity, 
reputation and norms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development of social capital 
Service implementation networks: relationships contain trust norms of 
reciprocity and form reputation 
Policy advocacy network: maintains much of the same structure 
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It may be that the existence of ties within advocacy networks requires the 
inclusion of a certain amount of attributes brought over from engagements in 
collaborative networks. These attributes include trust, norms, reciprocity and reputation 
but may also include perceived amounts or types of power. For nonprofit organizations to 
engage in advocacy they have to be assured that they do not face the threat of being 
perceived as politically driven, and they have to know that they will not face negative 
consequences from the state, donors or grantees as a result of their engagement in 
advocacy. The perceived threat of negative consequences explains the need for 
relationships based on informally built relational attributes such as reputation or trust. For 
example, Huxham (2003) observed the negotiation process will likely be more difficult if 
there is a lack of trust or there are perceived power disparities. Explicitly, in the absence 
of previous social capital building relations, advocacy relations may be less likely or will 
have a higher likelihood of floundering.         
There may be several relational attributes leading to the spillover of structures 
from service implementation networks to advocacy networks. The first of these is norms 
based on either reciprocity or trust. The development of norms in a network is important 
because as Kogut (2000 p. 410) noted they generate a “structure that dissuades rule 
breaking”. Furthermore, Kogut pointed out that network structure is generated by rules 
guiding the decisions that are made in cooperative arrangements. Structures of networks 
are, in other words, shaped by the rules of cooperation and the competing values that are 
present within the network. In the context of this study norms may play an important role 
in organizations’ decisions of who to cooperate with in advocacy networks based on rules 
established in previous cooperative arrangements.     
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Ostrom (1997) remarked that “many norms are learned from interactions with 
others in diverse communities about the behavior that is expected in particular types of 
situations” (Pg. 9). Ostrom went further when she explained the norm of reciprocity as a 
family of strategies which are to (1) identify other players, (2) make a decision as to who 
else may be a potential cooperator, (3) a decision to cooperate at least initially (4) a 
decision not to cooperate with those who do not reciprocate, and (5) an inclusion of 
retribution for those who betray trust. Ostrom’s research was applied to individual human 
behavior but may serve as a good heuristic in understanding organizational behavior in a 
network setting since organizational leaders are individual persons acting on behalf of 
their organizations, thus, individual-level theories will apply. Organizations may base the 
types of connections they have with others on the norms learned through their 
interactions in diverse communities. For instance, organizations may be engaged in 
activities that seek to identify other cooperators, engage in cooperation themselves, and 
do this with the expectation that others will respond with like behavior. These norm 
building activities may originate in the service implementation network governed by the 
NAO and continue in other network partitions that are not as formal. 
Trust, being closely related to the norm of reciprocity, has also been recognized as 
playing an important role in the facilitation of social capital (Varda, 2010) and is one of 
the critical elements affecting interorganizational relations (Powell , 1990). Lambright, 
Mischen, and Laramee (2010) noted that trust is important in networks because network 
cooperation is based upon interdependence and there are fewer hierarchical relations 
which ensure continued cooperation. The authors reported that successful past 
cooperation had a significant positive relationship to trust between dyads. They attributed 
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these findings to the idea that through past cooperation we learn whether a partner will 
act in our best interests. If we extend their findings here we can expect that organizations 
with past relationships of trust may be more likely to engage in other types of 
relationships. More expressly, organizations that trust each other based on past 
experiences may be more likely to engage in policy advocacy together. This is consistent 
with Ostrom’s (1997) framework for the norm of reciprocity. Gulati (1995) found that 
organizations are more likely to form alliances through repeated interactions because of 
trust and that this is a stronger predictor of inter-firm alliance than is equity. Again if we 
extend Gulati’s findings we can see, theoretically, that more interorganizational trust may 
lead to a propensity to advocate together. Conversely it may also be that a lack of trust 
will lead to less cooperation. 
Reputation is another relational attribute which may have an important role to 
play in determining whether the structure of a service delivery networks will carry over in 
the formation of policy advocacy network structures. Reputation is closely related to the 
norms of reciprocity and trust in that if one does not reciprocate or is untrustworthy they 
may end up with a bad reputation. Furthermore as Powell (1990, p. 326) stated “the 
reputation of a participant is the most visible signal of their reliability”. If actors within a 
service implementation network gain a reputation for being unreliable or untrustworthy 
they may find themselves excluded from networks developed for policy advocacy 
reasons. Conversely, if actors have reputations with desirable qualities they may be more 
sought after within the network and may be more likely to engage in collaborative 
advocacy efforts.        
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To generate an understanding of the governance network and its origins, it will be 
helpful to hang our conceptualization on Enroth (2011)’s framework for networks. Enroth 
noted that, for analytical purposes it is best to look at networks using a bottom up 
approach. That is, we should see networks not as part of already existing political 
boundaries and institutions but as a collection of independent wills to govern. These 
independent wills are collected into a broad range of actors such as “social movements, 
corporations, associations, organizations and institutions” (p. 32). These actors are again 
collected as individual wills to govern and aggregated into networks. If we incorporate 
the situation of the network under study into Enroth’s framework we can come to a 
summation of the theories brought to bear so far. First, whether spurred on by the NAO 
or through unilateral means, individual actors will seek out others forming dyads based 
on the need to implement services. These dyads, not existing in a vacuum, will form 
networks generated by resource interdependencies. As interorganizational rapport is built, 
social capital (i.e., trust, norms of reciprocity, and organizational reputation) will develop 
structures within the service implementation network. This structure will spill over to 
form new networks that can be based on policy advocacy. These new networks may be 
less formal and less dependent on the NAO. Since policy advocacy networks are not as 
dependent on the NAO and can be directed toward the wider authorizing environment 
(i.e., donors, citizens, the media, interest groups, and government funders) (Moore , 
2000)  they may be less centralized as well.                 
 H4: Policy advocacy networks, being less dependent upon the NAO, will be less 
centralized than service implementation networks.  
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 Network dyads based upon interdependencies will eventually form network 
substructures or partitions through the processes described above. The organizations 
within these substructures, also known as cliques, (defined as a subset of group members 
who are directly connected to each other; and all the actors must have no direct common 
link to any other actor, Kilduff and Tsai, 2003, p.46) will be more likely to maintain their 
dyadic interactions, formed in the service implementation network, when they engage in 
policy advocacy networks.     
H5: Organizations with membership in one or more service implementation clique 
will be more likely to engage in collaborative policy advocacy together.   
One way to measure whether the structure of service implementation networks 
spill over into policy advocacy networks is to measure simmelian ties between cliques 
otherwise known as clique overlap. Provan and Sabastian (1998) found that networks 
with a higher level of clique overlap (two independent cliques share one or more actors) 
were more likely to have a higher level of effectiveness. Furthermore, Krackhardt (1999) 
noted that a binding tie between two cliques has to adhere to a higher degree of constraint 
due to the norms that are present within both cliques. In other words, clique 1 and clique 
2 will develop sets of norms independently. The actor binding the two cliques together 
will have to adhere to norm constraints apparent in both cliques. As already discussed, 
decisions as to who an individual actor may cooperate with may be based on trust, norms 
of reciprocity, and reputation thus leading to structure. Therefore, actors with 
membership in one or more cliques are uniquely situated. Their position can give us 
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valuable insights into service implementation network structure and whether it is related 
to structures of policy advocacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
The study was based on a survey of the Bernalillo County (which includes the 
Albuquerque Metropolitan Area) mental health service network in New Mexico. The 
intended purpose of the study was to examine inter-agency collaboration at a whole 
network level within a centrally governed health and human services network. In 2009 
The New Mexico Interagency Behavioral Health Purchasing Collaborative decided to 
hire PH New Mexico to replace WO New Mexico as the statewide entity to manage 
mental health services for roughly 70,000 New Mexicans. The population that PH serves 
is highly diverse including many Medicaid recipients and minorities.  
 The transition to the new general contractor has not been smooth. Provider 
agencies within the network have faced delays in reimbursement from PH for the services 
that they have rendered. In response, in October 2009 the Collaborative issued a 
statement of non-compliance letter to PH. The statement required a directed corrective 
action plan, $1 million in sanction payment to providers, damages and the costs of a state 
monitor (www.hsd.state.nm.us/.../2010/BHSD-Collaborative-OHNM-1-27-10.pdf, 
accessed on 10/15/10). This coupled with turbulence from Medicaid, the largest payer of 
publicly-funded mental health services who is facing a $360.6 million shortfall in FY 
2012, is making for an uncertain environment. Furthermore, these issues have led to the 
state directing PH to implement a 3% reduction across a number of Medicaid providers 
and practitioners. Additional reductions to pharmacy dispensing fees, hospitals and 
outpatient hospital services are effective in FY10 as well (New Mexico Legislative 
Finance Committee, 2010; Boyd, 2010).The rough transition to PH, coupled with the 
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fast-deteriorating state behavioral health budget situation, is likely to aggregate the 
uncertainty and intensify the resource pressure on service providers (Cunningham, 
Bazzoli, & Katz , 2008). 
Network Approach 
This research was based upon a mixed method design including a network survey 
with follow-up interviews. Our network sample and boundaries were determined through 
a directory that was provided by WO New Mexico. From this directory we identified 34 
adult seriously mentally ill (SMI) network service provider agencies by calling each 
agency and confirming their contractual relationship with PH. We also confirmed each 
agency’s executive director contact information and that the predominant clients served 
are adults with serious mental illness (i.e., severe depression, bipolar disorder, or 
schizophrenia). After PH assumed responsibility over the system in 2010 we asked the 
Region 3 (Bernalillo County) Director of PH to double check our list. This verification 
process narrowed our list of agencies down to 33 which included 19 nonprofit, 10 for-
profit, and 4 public agencies.  
We also obtained a letter of support for our study from the Chief Executive 
Officer of the New Mexico Behavioral Health Collaborative. The Collaborative is the 
state agency who oversees the statewide behavioral health services contract with the 
statewide agency PH New Mexico. The letter of support turned out to be a valuable tool 
to secure the cooperation of the agencies that were surveyed.  
In the summer of 2010 surveys were sent to the executives of the 33 identified 
mental health service providers. We used Dillman’s (2007) method for administering 
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mail surveys. We first sent out a wave of pre-study notices a week prior to the mailing of 
the actual survey. One week later we mailed the surveys which included a cover letter, 
the support letter, the survey, and a postage prepaid return envelope. After two weeks we 
sent a second round of survey packages to the non-respondents. After several rounds of 
reminder letters, a third wave of surveys, reminder phone calls, and meeting with agency 
executives we received 31 responses which accounts for a 93.9% (31/33) response rate.  
After collecting the survey responses we conducted follow up interviews with 7 
respondent agency executives in the fall of 2010. The interviewed executives represented 
two for-profit and five nonprofit agencies. We developed a set of open ended interview 
questions and used the same questions with all of the agencies but included some small 
changes throughout the process based on earlier answers. We created the questions based 
on answers that we received from the survey respondents. The interview questions were 
vetted by two senior mental health researchers. Each of the interviews lasted for about 
one hour and was audio recorded to ensure accuracy. During the interview notes were 
taken by hand to record respondents’ gestures that were not picked up by the audio 
recording. Each interview recording was then transcribed verbatim. Atlas.ti (2011), a 
qualitative research software program, was used to analyze and code the transcripts. 
Collaborative policy advocacy was one of the major themes that emerged from the cross 
transcript coding.  
Measures 
Based on Provan and Milward’s (1995) seminal study we developed a roster-
matrix questionnaire. Respondents were given a grid with each of the 33 organizations 
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listed on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis four types of relationships (sharing 
information about service innovation, sharing resources, policy advocacy, and referral) 
were listed. We asked respondents to place a check in a box next to the name of an 
agency corresponding to the type of network relationship they were involved in if they 
had the interaction with said agency within the last twelve months. Respondents were 
also asked to draw a circle around the check if they had frequent interaction with the 
agency. In the instructions section we defined policy advocacy as collaboratively 
advocating for mental health policy action on behalf of clients and/or service provider 
agencies. Sharing resources was defined to include things like sharing physical facilities 
or collaborating in joint programs etc. Sharing information about service innovation was 
defined as sharing information on mental health service innovations, such as cultural 
competence, evidence based practices, and new treatment methods. Lastly, the referral 
relationship was not defined due to its self-explanatory nature. The three non-advocacy 
variables were operationally defined as representing service implementation networks. 
Variable Operationalization for MRQAP-DDSP 
Independent Variables. To create three of the independent variables (shared resources 
clique overlap, shared information clique overlap, and referrals clique overlap) we first 
entered survey responses from the 31 roster matrices forming 31 x 31 matrices 
representing each of our three variables. We confirmed the three types of ties by 
symmetrizing the matrices by product (Provan, Huang, Milward, 2009), which replaces 
cells Xij and cell Xji in the matrix by Xij*Xji, i<j. In other words we only count the tie if 
it has been confirmed by both actors. A clique analysis in UCINET was then run. One of 
the outputs is a new 31 x 31 matrix saved as clique overlap. This matrix is an actor-by-
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actor clique co-membership matrix where a value of k in row i column j represents the 
number of cliques that vertices i and j are co-members. Values in the i-th diagonal 
represent the number of cliques that i is included within.  
Another variable (multiplex cliques used in table 4) was created by symmetrizing 
the root matrices of shared resources, shared info about service innovation, and referrals 
and then adding them together. This matrix, the sum of the first three variables, was then 
run through the clique analysis operation in UCINET. From this an actor-by-actor clique 
co membership matrix was created. This variable, Multiplex (clique overlap), is a 
variable taking into account the three types of service implementation ties that we 
measured. This variable was used in the multiplex models.      
Another independent variable was created by using the matrix algebra function in 
UCINET 6 to add sharing information and referrals together creating a new multiplex 
matrix. I then ran a clique analysis which identified 18 cliques. Then, by hand, I 
identified all of the organizations who shared a clique with the NAO which accounted for 
13 out of the 31 organizations. This created a new attribute which was then ran through 
the attribute to matrix function in UCINET 6. This resulted in a new network matrix 
which was used as a control variable called NAO clique co-membership (multiplex). I 
decided to use NAO clique co-membership (multiplex) as an independent variable 
because if organizations are locked into a clique with the NAO it would be expected that 
they would engage in policy advocacy together. It should be noted here that resource 
sharing was not included within this multiplex variable because there were no cliques 
where the NAO was a member. 
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Two other variables similar to NAO clique co-membership (multiplex) were 
created. The first was created by running a clique analysis on the referrals variable 
identifying each clique and the members thereof. I then, by hand, identified each 
organization that shared a clique with the NAO. If an organization was in a clique with 
the NAO they were coded as a 1 and a 0 if not. This attribute array was then run through 
the attribute to matrix function in UCINET. This new variable was called NAO clique co-
membership (referrals). I ran the exact same operation on the sharing information matrix 
to create the variable NAO clique co-membership (sharing information). These variables 
were used in the first regression which tested each type of tie separately without the 
multiplex variables. Again I did not run the same operation on shared resources because 
there were no cliques within that network that included the NAO. 
     The next independent variable was created to measure similar dependence on 
the NAO. In the survey organizations were asked to report the percentage of their 2010 
budget that their contract with PHNM represented. The data was then run through 
UCINET 6’s attribute to matrix function using absolute difference. In other words, 
subtracting the differences in two organizations’ percentage of budget that came from the 
NAO, I created a variable that measured the degree of similarity in two organizations’ 
dependence on PHNM. This variable was labeled NAO dependence and was used 
because it is expected that similar dependence on the NAO may result in organizations 
working together in policy advocacy. The purpose of this variable is to shine some light 
on hypothesis 1 which asks whether similar dependence on an NAO will be related to 
policy advocacy.  
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Three interaction variables were created as the product of interaction between 
similar dependence on the NAO and clique co-membership with the NAO. The first of 
these three was a multiplex variable which combined NAO Clique co-membership 
(multiplex) and similar dependence. This variable was created by using the matrix 
algebra function in UCINET and taking the product of the two variables. In doing so a 1 
in row i column j in the NAO clique co-membership matrix would result in one times the 
difference in budget each organization reported came from the NAO in the new matrix. A 
0 in row i column j of the clique co-membership matrix would result in a 0 being placed 
in the corresponding vector in the new hybrid matrix. Since this operation has the effect 
of removing the absolute difference scores of the organizations who did not share clique 
co-membership with the NAO I was able to isolate those organizations with greater 
homophily when it comes to dependence on the NAO and clique co-membership with the 
NAO. The creation of this variable was specifically designed to test hypothesis 3 with my 
multiplex models. This variable is labeled Similar Dependence X NAO clique co-
membership (multiplex).   
The other two variables were created in a similar fashion as the foregoing 
description except that instead of using the NAO clique co-membership (multiplex) 
matrix I used NAO clique co-membership (referrals) for one and NAO clique co-
membership (sharing information) for the other. These two variables were created to test 
hypothesis three in the non-multiplex models. They are labeled Similar Dependence X 
NAO clique co-membership (referrals) and Similar Dependence X NAO clique co-
membership (information sharing) respectively.  
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Dependent Variable. The dependent variable, policy advocacy, was created in much the 
same way that the first three independent variables were created. First we entered data 
from the 31 roster-matrices which corresponded to policy advocacy. Second, the data was 
arranged in a 31 x 31 matrix with each agency listed in the first row and first column. 
Next a one was placed in row i column j if there was a relationship. If the relationship 
was frequent a two was placed in the corresponding vector.   
Control Variables The first control variable that was used looked at the sector that each 
organization came from. The sector variable is important because it is expected that if 
organizations are in the same sector they will be more likely to collaborate in policy 
advocacy. The second control variable, size in full time employees (FTE), was used 
because it was expected that if two organizations are similar in size they would also be 
more likely to collaborate in policy advocacy. This variable was created by using 
UCINET’s attribute to matrix function with absolute difference. This operation had the 
effect of creating a matrix where the value in row i column j represents the absolute 
difference in FTEs between two organizations.    
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CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
For quantitative data analysis we used UCINET 6 (Borgatti , Everett, & Freeman , 
2002), Netdraw (Borgatti , 2002), and SPSS. The first statistical test that was used in the 
analysis of the data was a simple one tail paired sample t-test. This test was used to test 
hypothesis 2 which asks if there is a difference between the centrality of service 
implementation networks and policy advocacy networks. I decided to use a one tailed t-
test in SPSS because it helps to identify the difference in means between two groups’ 
samples taken within the same population. This test was first run by determining the 
centrality scores for each of the organizations in each of the networks using UCINET. 
This data was then imported to SPSS to run the t-test.  
Another statistical test used was multiple regression quadratic assignment 
procedure (MRQAP) with double Dekker semi-partialling (DDSP). This test was used to 
regress the independent variables and the three control variables against the dependent 
variable. The reason why MRQAP was used is because of the problem inherent in 
network data of autocorrelation of errors (Dekker, Krackhardt, and Snijders, 2007). 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) does not account for network data that is autocorrelated 
and thus is not robust enough for our purposes here. In other words, we are analyzing our 
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data at the dyadic level and actors respond with reference to one another, with these 
conditions analysis using OLS will result in biased estimators.       
MRQAP-DDSP is carried out in three stages. First, it calculates the residuals of 
all the independent variables in the model. Second, it creates a new residual matrix of the 
independent variable. Third, it randomly permutes all of the rows and columns of the 
independent variable residuals, in matrix form, and re-computes the regression. These 
steps are carried out many times, in the case of this study 2,000 times (Dekker, 
Krackhardt, & Snijders, 2007). The R-squared and regression coefficients from these 
random runs are stored and later used to assemble empirical sampling distributions to 
estimate standard errors under the hypothesis of no association (Hanneman & Riddle , 
2005; Kilduff & Tsai , 2003). The procedure is similar to the Freedman-lane (1983) 
approach except that the calculation of residuals and the permutation occur on the left 
side of the model equation. According to Dekker et al. (2007) both procedures are equally 
robust under simulated conditions containing high levels of skewness and spuriousness. 
Furthermore, DDSP minimizes the effects of collinearity and is robust to its effects. 
Six models were tested all together. The first three in table four represent all of 
the variables that were not multiplex variables. In other words, each independent variable 
was created taking each type of tie into account separately. For example, the three clique 
overlap independent variables in table four represent separate types of ties. This is in 
contrast to the multiplex (clique overlap) variable in table 5 which takes all three clique 
overlap variables into consideration at the same time. Tables 5 takes into account all of 
the multiplex variables, which in their own respective ways; combine some of the 
variables from table 4 (excluding the control variables and NAO dependence). The 
28 
 
reason why separate ties were considered on one table and multiplex relations were 
considered on the other is that it will help us to gain a better understanding of the 
different dynamics at play when we compare the two types of tables together. In other 
words, some of the variables may have reduced explanatory power when we consider 
their types of ties separately but may become more explanatory when they are combined. 
Conversely, explanatory power may be reduced when the types of ties are combined 
giving insight into which variables might be moderating. Splitting these models into two 
separate tests all together may also help to reduce the effects of multicollinearity.          
Findings 
Graph 2 is a novel network illustration showing the correlation between 
underlying network structures of service implementation and policy advocacy. In order to 
arrive at this illustration several data transforming operations occurred. The full multiplex 
network illustration at the top was produced by; first, confirming the ties of the three 
variables associated with service implementation networks by using the 
TransformSymmetrizeby product function in UCINET (Borgatti , Everett, & 
Freeman , 2002); second, the three variables were added together using the UCINET 
matrix algebra function creating a multiplex matrix; lastly, Netdraw (Borgatti , 2002) was 
used to draw the graph. The network on the lower right was produced by simply 
confirming the ties of the policy advocacy network and using Netdraw to create the 
illustration. Since the multiplex network at the top does not tell us very much about how 
service implementation network structures are related to policy advocacy network 
structures I reduced some of the excess noise, for illustrative purposes, and created the 
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graph on the lower left. This network is the same as the top one except that only common 
nodes between the multiplex graph and the policy advocacy graph are included.  
If one compares the lower two graphs one can see that the structure of the service 
implementation multiplex network is similar to the structure of the policy advocacy 
network. In other words these two networks, created for very different reasons, share a 
similar backbone. For further comparative purposes I ran a QAP correlation and the 
pearson correlation coefficient was .63, p <.01.  These results indicate that there is high 
degree of correlation between the two networks with common nodes at the bottom. 
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Figure 2 Novel network visualization illustrating the tendency for service 
implementation network structures to spill over into policy advocacy network 
structures. Note the similar underlying backbone 
 
 
Full multiplex network including 
three independent variables 
(Resource sharing, shared 
information about service innovation 
and referrals) added together. Graph 
includes confirmed ties only.  
Same multiplex network with nodes 
subtracted that were not in common 
with the policy advocacy network 
Policy advocacy network some 
of the same underlying structure 
persists 
r=.63*** 
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Table 1 Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlations 
Mean  S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Sector  0.36 0.48 --- 
2 Size 88.0 149.49 -0.15** --- 
3 Sharing Information (clique 
overlap) 0.05 0.28 -0.04 0.12* --- 
4 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(sharing information) 0.03 0.17 -0.03 0.18** 0.27*** --- 
5 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(referrals) 0.03 0.17 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 --- 
6 Referrals (clique overlap) 0.07 0.33 -0.02 0.11 0.42*** 0.21** 0.18** --- 
7 Resources (clique overlap) 0.00 0.08 -0.06 -0.36 0.36*** 0.13* -0.01 0.22** 
8 NAO Similar Dependence  0.20 0.25 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 
9 Similar Dependence X NAO 
Clique Co- Membership (referrals) 0.70 0.25 -0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.26*** 0.05 
10 Similar Dependence X NAO 
Clique Co-Membership (Sharing 
Information) 0.22 0.67 -0.06** 0.20** 0.05 0.16*** 0.04 0.08* 
11 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(multiplex) 0.16 0.37 -0.06 0.17* 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.23*** 
12 Similar Dependence X NAO 
Clique Co-Membership (multiplex) 
1.17 1.86 -0.04 0.08 0.06 0.13** 0.18*** 0.09* 
13 Multiplex (clique overlap) 0.15 0.57 -0.00 0.09 0.70*** 0.31*** 0.14* 0.82*** 
14 Policy Advocacy 0.04 0.21 -0.01 0.05 0.52*** 0.07 -0.03 0.46*** 
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Table 1 Continued 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Sector  
2 Size 
3 Sharing Information (clique 
overlap) 
4 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(Sharing Information) 
5 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(Referrals) 
6 Referrals (clique overlap) 
7 Resources (clique overlap) --- 
8 NAO Similar Dependence  -0.03 --- 
9 Similar Dependence X  NAO 
Clique Co- Membership (Referrals) 0.01 0.23*** --- 
10 Similar Dependence X NAO 
Clique Co-Membership (Sharing 
Information) 0.05* 0.21*** 0.24 --- 
11 NAO Clique Co-Membership 
(multiplex) 0.03 0.05 0.25*** 0.21*** --- 
12 Similar Dependence X NAO 
Clique Co-Membership (multiplex) 
0.04 0.29*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.40*** --- 
13 Multiplex (clique overlap) 0.25*** -0.06 0.06 0.08* 0.33*** 0.12** --- 
14 Policy Advocacy 0.35*** 0.00 0.04 0.08* 0.23*** 0.12** 0.49*** --- 
* p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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To test hypothesis 4, positing that policy advocacy networks will be less 
centralized than service implementation networks, a one tailed paired sample t-test test 
was run as described above. In order to operationalize the variables so that the difference 
in means based on network centrality could be measured I had to follow several steps. 
First, all four variables had to be symmetrized by product so that the ties could be 
confirmed. Next in order to create a fourth independent variable (multiplexity) I used the 
matrix algebra function in UCINET to add the three symmetrized independent variables 
together. A degree centrality analysis on all the variables including multiplexity was then 
run. Since all the variables were symmetrized the centrality score measures the amount of 
vertices adjacent to each vertex as opposed to measuring in degree and out degree for 
said vertices. After this four paired sample t-tests were run with policy advocacy (degree 
centrality) serving as the common variable in which all the other variable’s centrality 
scores where tested.     
Some of the results from the centrality analysis were worth noting. For example, 
in the multiplex network PHNM, the NAO, was the most central actor and had 18 
adjacent vertices. This was interesting because the next central actor was GNCH and had 
10 adjacent vertices. If we compare this to the centrality scores of the policy advocacy 
network PHNM had a score of 7 while the next central actor BH had a score of 5. 
Furthermore, comparing the overall centrality scores for each of the five networks, policy 
advocacy scores at 10.29%; this is below the centrality scores for each of the service 
implementation networks. This points to the assumption that centrality for policy 
advocacy may be less than service implementation networks.  
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As far as the paired sample t-tests go we can see, with a decent amount of 
certainty, that one can reject the null hypotheses and make the decision that there is a 
statistically significant difference between mean degree centrality scores in three of our 
four variables representing service implementation networks from that of our dependent 
variable policy advocacy (degree centrality). The one variable that was not significantly 
different was resource sharing.  Furthermore, since this is a one tail test and the critical 
value of t is 1.6973 we can conclude that the mean centrality score for policy advocacy is 
significantly less than the mean centrality scores for information sharing, referrals, and 
multiplexity.  This is in support of hypothesis two.  
Table 2 Paired Sample T-Test (one tail)  
Test includes the mean difference between Policy Advocacy (Degree Centrality) and 
the other variables 
Variables  T-Statistic  Mean 
Difference 
Overall Network 
Centralization score 
(%) 
Information Sharing 
(degree centrality) 
-2.257** -.580 16.38 
Referrals (Degree 
Centrality) 
-4.325*** -2.387 29.20 
Resource Sharing 
(degree centrality) 
1.668 .322 12.64 
Multiplex (degree 
centrality) 
-5.101*** -2.322 25.75 
Note: DF=30 for all variables   
* p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01  
Policy Advocacy’s overall network centrality score was 10.29%  
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Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the MRQAP-DDSP tests. In model 1 table 4 
the control variables, (1) representing sector that each organization was in, and (2) the 
size of each organization as measured by FTE, were regressed against the dependent 
variable of policy advocacy. In this model neither of the variables are significant and very 
little of the variation in the dependent variable is explained. Model 2, with the overlap 
variables included, explains much more of the variation in the dependent variable at 37%. 
In this model all three variables that represent service implementation networks were 
highly significant and were found to have a linear relationship to policy advocacy. This is 
in support of Hypothesis 5 which posits a relationship between service implementation 
clique membership and collaborative policy advocacy. Similar dependence on the NAO 
by itself was not a significant predictor of policy advocacy and this was not in support of 
Hypothesis 1. Membership in a clique where the NAO is also a member had a high 
amount of significance for Sharing information but the relationship was negative. This is 
evidence that sharing a clique with the NAO, where the relationship is sharing 
information, may actually suppress dyadic engagement in policy advocacy. NAO clique 
co-membership (referrals) was not a significant predictor dyadic engagement in policy 
advocacy.  The product of Similar Dependence and NAO clique co-membership (sharing 
information) was marginally significant. This meant that NAO dependence and NAO 
clique co-membership, when taken together, had only a slight amount of significance.   
 
 
 
36 
 
 
Table 3 Results of Multiple Regression QAP with DDSP (independent relations)  
Variables  Model 1(Control 
Variables) 
Model 2 (with 
overlap variables) 
Model 3 (with NAO 
specific variables)  
Sector -0.012 -0.011 0.010 
Size (Full Time 
Employees) 
0.050 -0.015 -0.14 
Sharing Information 
(clique overlap) 
 0.348*** 0.362*** 
Referrals (clique 
overlap) 
 0.284*** 0.314*** 
Resource Sharing 
(clique overlap) 
 0.161*** 0.161** 
NAO Clique co-
membership (Sharing 
information) 
  -0.112*** 
NAO Clique co-
membership 
(Referrals) 
  -0.083 
NAO Similar 
Dependence 
  -0.036 
Similar Dependence 
X NAO Clique co-
membership 
(Referrals)  
  0.025 
Similar Dependence 
X NAO Clique co-
membership (Sharing 
Information) 
  0.039* 
R² (Adj. R²) 0.003(0.002) 0.372(0.369)*** 0.392(0.386)*** 
Note: Dependent Variable: Policy Advocacy 
All coefficients presented are standardized coefficients * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01 
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Table 5 presents the results of the models including the multiplex variables. 
Model 1 again only tested the control variables and there was no significance. Model 2 
tested Similar Dependence on the NAO and the Multiplex (clique overlap) variable which 
is a combination of the clique overlap variables from the previous table. Multiplex (clique 
overlap), in this model, was shown to have significant linear relationship to policy 
advocacy. The result was moderated from the previous table where the variables were 
tested separately. The R² in model two table 5 (0.247) was significantly less than the R² 
in model two table 4 (0.372). There are two possible reasons for why this occurred. First, 
the lower R² result may be due to resource sharing not having as close a linear 
relationship as the other clique overlap variables. There may have been a moderating 
effect. Second, multiplex ties result in more links being counted than were present in the 
dependent variable (policy advocacy) which is a tie that is being considered separately. A 
larger amount of ties in the multiplex relation may have resulted in less variability in the 
dependent variable being explained. NAO clique co-membership (multiplex) had no 
explanatory power. NAO Similar Dependence X Clique co-membership (multiplex) was 
found to have a weak linear relationship to Policy Advocacy. Model three added less than 
one percent of explanatory power to model 2.   
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Table 4 Results of Multiple Regression QAP with DDSP (multiplex relations)  
Variables  Model 1(Control 
Variables) 
Model 2 (with 
NAO similar 
dependence and 
Multiplex Cliques)  
Model 3 (including 
interaction term) 
Sector -0.012 -0.016 -0.012 
Size (Full Time 
Employees) 
0.050 0.003 -0.006 
NAO Similar 
Dependence  
 0.035 -0.018 
Multiplex (clique 
overlap)  
 0.497*** 0.473*** 
NAO Clique co-
membership 
(multiplex) 
   0.053 
NAO similar 
dependence X Clique 
co-membership 
(multiplex)  
   0.042* 
R² (Adj. R²) 0.003(0.002) 0.247(0.244)*** 0.253(0.249)*** 
Note: Dependent Variable: Policy Advocacy 
All coefficients presented are standardized coefficients * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01 
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CHAPTER 5 QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS DISCUSSION 
To summarize the quantitative findings there was little to no support for 
hypothesis 1, which posits a relationship between similar NAO dependence and policy 
advocacy in general. This may be explained in the context of this study. First, the 
network is centrally governed where the majority of actors are either nonprofit or public 
entities. In this type of network similar dependence on resources from the NAO may be 
less important than homophily in other areas such as similar organizational culture or 
similar clients. Another factor which may be unique to this type of network is that actors 
who are engaged in policy advocacy may place a higher importance on the missions of 
their respective organizations. Consequently, ties made for the purpose of advancing 
organizational missions may be more explanatory than ties made based on the NAO. This 
supposition may also explain the negative relationship between organizations that are 
engaged in cliques with the NAO (information sharing) and their lack of dyadic 
engagement when engaged in relationships where the NAO is not present such as Policy 
Advocacy.   
Furthermore, since the network, at the time of the survey, was experiencing 
resource turbulence there may have been a decrease in the amount of trust organizations 
had in the NAO. For example, in our interviews with the seven agency executives, one 
common theme that surfaced was a sense of anxiety over the NAO’s push for core 
service agencies (CSA). This may have been seen as a threat to many of the smaller 
agencies in the network who may not have had the resources to provide all or most of the 
services their clients need. Since earlier research points to the idea that trust is an 
important factor in network cohesion (Lambright, Mischen, & Laramee, 2010; Gulati, 
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1995), the NAO may have been marginalized in importance in the policy advocacy 
network in general. Therefore it may have been for these reasons that common 
dependence on the NAO was not as an important factor by itself. 
 It may have also been for trust reasons that engagement in a clique with the NAO 
was observed to have a negative influence on dyadic engagement in policy advocacy 
generally. This observation provided contradictory evidence for hypothesis 2 stating that 
engagements in cliques with the NAO will be related to engagement in policy advocacy. 
NAO clique co-membership (sharing information) had a statistically significant negative 
linear relationship to policy advocacy. This suggests that organizations embedded in 
cliques with the NAO may not trust other non-NAO organizations within the clique 
enough to engage in policy advocacy together, generally speaking. As was noted above, 
trust has been shown to be an important factor in organizational decisions to engage in 
policy advocacy together.  
It is important to note that NAO clique co-membership (referrals) returned 
inconclusive results. This may be explained by the nature of ties made based on referrals. 
In order for an organization to have a referral tie, each organization has to simply send 
their patients to another organization within the network. Direct communication is not a 
requirement, therefore, relationships based on trust and reciprocity may play a less 
important role. On the other hand, ties made based on sharing information require more 
communication between organizations. Trust and reciprocity may play a more central 
role in communication based on sharing information in a service implementation 
network. Thus, ties made based on the organizational need to share information, which 
carries the requirement of formal communication, may be more likely to result in dyadic 
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relationships of policy advocacy. Less formal ties based on referrals, requiring less 
communication, may be less likely to spill over into structures of policy advocacy.  
Hypothesis three, which posits a relationship between dyadic relationships of 
policy advocacy and NAO clique co-membership with similar dependence on the NAO, 
had mixed results when tested. More specifically, the variable which tested Similar 
Dependence X Clique co-membership (Referrals) was not significant while the other 
variables used to test this hypothesis had marginal significance. One possible explanation 
for why the Referrals variable had no significance is for the aforementioned reasons. One 
organization sending a patient to another organization carries no requirement of direct 
communication. Thus there is less of an opportunity for trust and reciprocity to play a 
central role.  
Conversely, the other two variables which tested hypothesis three had marginal 
positive significance. This was unexpected considering the results of hypotheses 1 and 2. 
For example, NAO Clique Co-membership (Sharing Information) by itself was observed 
to have a significant negative relationship to policy advocacy while NAO Similar 
Dependence had no significance. The results in table 5, testing the multiplex variables, 
were similar to this as well. This can be explained by the operations that were used to 
develop these variables. NAO similar dependence takes into account all of the 
organizations tested within the network when it was tested by itself. On the other hand, 
the NAO Clique Co-membership variables take into account only those organizations that 
are locked into a clique with the NAO. When these two variables are multiplied only 
those organizations that have both similar dependence and are in a clique with the NAO 
are taken into account.  
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This explains algebraically why similar dependence on the NAO and sharing a 
clique with the NAO, when taken together, and while excluding those organizations that 
did not have these two ties in common, had different results than when considered 
separately. A possible explanation for this observation theoretically rests in the idea that 
organizations who share information with each other, and with the NAO, together in a 
clique setting, may have built relationships of trust, reputation, and reciprocity. This may 
have led to a greater possibility of these specific organizations engaging in dyadic 
relationships of policy advocacy. If we take Borgatti and Halgin (2011)’s bonding theory 
we can apply it here. It may be that these specific organizations have found other actors 
who have similar dependence on the NAO and have decided to engage in policy and 
advocacy to counteract the power of the NAO. One interesting area of possible further 
research may be to gain an understanding of the content of the policy advocacy between 
organizations which fall within this particular category.    
Furthermore, the results of hypotheses 1-3, taken together, point to the possibility 
that there may be two categories of agencies within the broader mental health network. 
The first category of organization is not connected to the NAO through cliques and 
similar dependence on the NAO is not important. The other category of organization is 
connected to the NAO clique-wise, and similar dependence on the NAO is more 
important. This observation can be further understood by the reported results of the 
variables used to test hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 posits a relationship between 
collaborative policy advocacy and service implementation clique membership. Two 
variables in table 4, Sharing Information (clique overlap) and Referrals (clique overlap), 
were observed to be significant while the third variable Resource Sharing (clique overlap) 
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was observed to have moderate significance. In table 5 Multiplex (clique overlap) was 
observed to be significant also. This is strong evidence in support of hypothesis 5 and 
confirms the supposition that membership in service implementation cliques are related 
to dyadic engagement in policy advocacy.  
Generally speaking, service implementation cliques are highly related to policy 
advocacy but when we look more closely we can see that the underlying dynamics are 
more complex. On one hand, those organizations that are both similarly dependent on the 
NAO and who share a clique with the NAO are more likely to engage in dyadic 
relationships of policy advocacy. On the other, those organizations that only share a 
clique with the NAO and are not similarly dependent will be less likely to engage in 
dyadic relationships of policy advocacy. The difference between these two categories is 
that, generally speaking, a higher amount of trust is placed on organizational relationships 
that are garnered outside of the NAO’s realm. When similar dependence on the NAO is 
introduced we start to see an increase in importance on that dependence. The introduction 
of dependence may signal homophilly between organizations when it comes to their 
policy advocacy needs. In other words, these organizations may have similar needs when 
it comes to garnering resources in the environment through policy advocacy.                                       
The statistical support for hypothesis 5, positing a relationship between service 
implementation cliques and dyadic engagement in policy advocacy, helps us garner a 
wider understanding of the centrally governed network as a whole. Since our data was 
not longitudinal I cannot say that service implementation networks lead to policy 
advocacy networks. What we can say, with a degree of statistical confidence, is that the 
two types of networks are related and thus there is a possibility that one leads to another. 
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It may be a good idea for further research to look into this possibility. Some of the 
reasons why we can hypothesize on the idea that service implementation networks lead to 
policy advocacy networks, is related to some of the literature that I laid out in the 
beginning of this thesis. More specifically, it may be that the development of service 
implementation networks creates social capital which may lead to a greater probability 
that actors will engage in networks of policy advocacy. It is worth noting at this point that 
this probably does not occur in a vacuum and that there may be other types of networks 
or influences that shape policy advocacy networks. In this specific centrally governed 
network of health and human service provider agencies our data may be showing 
evidence of service implementation network structure and its link to policy advocacy 
network structure. For the purposes of exploring this further the next section will add to 
the discussion by attempting to discover some of the content of policy advocacy. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONTENT OF POLICY ADVOCACY 
By using interviews which included seven of the surveyed organizations’ 
executives (five nonprofit and two for profit) we were able to advance some of the 
theoretical framework and develop a more robust picture of our service implementation 
and policy advocacy networks. These interviews were conducted in the fall of 2010 
which happened to be a resource turbulent time for many of the organizations in our 
study. The reason why we chose to use a mixed method design for this research is 
because the quantitative data was only able to answer questions related to whether or not 
there is a relationship between service implementation network structure and policy 
advocacy network structure. Qualitative data is better suited to answer the how and why 
questions using contextual evidence. In other words, in order to gain a fuller picture, it is 
not enough to ask whether the two objects of inquiry are related but one must also ask 
how the relationship came into being and why the relationship exists. Furthermore, this 
type of research can help to inform later research into related areas of inquiry.  
In the quantitative findings section above some of the possible explanations for 
why there are lower centrality scores for policy advocacy networks than for service 
implementation networks are posited. There is also a discussion proposing reasons for 
why similar dependence on the NAO had no explanatory power in the general network 
when considered by itself. The suggested reasons for both of these observations were 
related to the idea that the NAO is more detached from policy advocacy networks than it 
is from service implementation networks. In the interview data there was anecdotal 
evidence backing these suppositions. Huxam (2003) noted that a lack of trust will result 
in making the process of collaboration more difficult. There are several different 
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instances where organizations expressed a lack of trust in either the Collaborative or the 
NAO in charge of paying agencies for services rendered under Medicaid. One example 
can be illustrated by the following response from an agency executive that provides 
services to newly released female prisoners.  
“They want to keep it in house [CSAs] but partly why take on the headache you 
know because PHNM has created a contract that makes them financially and 
legally responsible for the sub-contractors and it’s like they don’t want that and 
there is nothing in it for them so you know in theory we are attempting to 
collaborate and it’s not happening right now so I would say perhaps what our 
approach has been has been to both in all respects HUD and the budget and the 
um core service agencies is to really focus on the policy and advocacy work to try 
and make some system wide changes”. 
The system wide changes that this agency executive was referring to were related 
to the NAO’s push for more Core Service Agencies (CSA). More CSAs, in the opinion of 
this executive, would have resulted in the agency receiving reduced funds for services 
rendered under Medicaid. The proposed structure under the new CSA model would have 
made it so that smaller organizations were cut out of the funding loop. The CSAs would 
have wanted to provide most of their services in house. The source of the lack of trust for 
the NAO seemingly comes from their perceived interests in lowering their administrative 
costs by contracting with as few organizations as possible and structuring contracts in a 
way that effectively cuts smaller organizations out. Another executive leading an agency 
that provides healthcare services to homeless people, while listing off a large amount of 
strategic collaborations that her organization is involved in, stated that “the local 
collaborative um we haven’t had anyone there for a while”.  
The above statement by the executive from the agency that provides services to 
newly released female prisoners provides content helping to explain the results of 
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hypothesis 2. In sum this hypothesis stated that there would be a relationship between 
membership in cliques with the NAO and dyadic engagement in policy advocacy. This 
agency was identified through the qualitative analysis to be engaged in a four 
organization clique with PH (the NAO), BH, and TMH. BH and TMH are both 
considered to be CSAs while the organization that made the statement (DF) is a smaller 
organization and at the time was not considered to be a CSA. DF’s statement to add 
further context was referring to BH and TMH in response to a question asked by the 
interviewer. The statement provided some evidence that the NAO has structured its 
contracts with service providers in a way that reduces the likelihood that these 
organizations will include non CSA agencies in service implementation. It may also be 
for this reason that the CSA organizations within this clique are less likely to engage in 
collaborative policy advocacy.      
Another issue that is related to the trust problems that many of the agencies have 
with the NAO has to do with the NAO’s lack of reciprocity. If we go back to Ostrom 
(1997)’s heuristic for the norm of reciprocity we can find evidence that the NAO was not 
adhering to at least some of these norms for several of the agencies that we interviewed. 
The fourth and fifth steps in Ostrom’s heuristic which includes; first, a decision not to 
cooperate with those who do not reciprocate; and second, retribution for those who betray 
trust-- may explain some of the detachment the NAO is experiencing when organizations 
collaborate in policy advocacy. One example of this can be found in a comment that was 
made by an executive whose agency provides services to people with developmental 
disabilities.  
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“And for instance [PHNM] (the NAO) I mean I don’t admire them for anything 
they just called us the other day probably owe us 60,000 dollars but they ran out 
of money for the last fiscal year. And they are not paying any of it. I mean it’s 
absurd and people complained about [WONM] and I am telling you we never had 
that problem. We had problems with [WONM] but never that type of stuff”. 
 
This organization is locked into a contractual agreement with the NAO which means that 
their options are limited as far as reciprocity goes when it comes to service 
implementation. If Ostrom (1997) turns out to be correct we can expect that this 
organization will be less willing to collaborate with the NAO when it comes to work that 
may be optional such as policy advocacy. This may be an area for further consideration. 
 The findings from the qualitative analysis so far have helped to provide an 
anecdotal picture of the test results for hypothesis 1 and 4. The tested hypotheses 
proposing (1) that similar dependence on the NAO may be related to policy advocacy, 
and (2) that there will be lower centrality scores for policy advocacy networks than for 
the service implementation networks; provided evidence that the NAO may not be very 
well connected in policy advocacy networks. The tests performed on these two 
hypotheses were simply able to tell us that there was less centrality and that dependence 
on the NAO was not explanatory, in a general sense, when it came to policy advocacy 
networks. What this qualitative analysis does is give us anecdotal answers to some of the 
why and how questions associated with the two hypotheses. In other words, trust and 
norms of reciprocity probably played a central role in determining how connected the 
NAO was, and how centralized the policy advocacy networks were. This is relevant 
because the NAO may find that its importance has been marginalized within the wider 
network. 
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In order to provide anecdotal answers to some of the why and how questions 
associated with the proposition in hypothesis 5; that service implementation network 
structure is related to policy advocacy network structure, I have provided the following 
tables and analysis. Several themes emerged from the analysis which relate to the 
building of social capital. These emerging themes were related to Putnam (1995)’s 
elements of social capital. The elements (trust, norms of reciprocity, and reputation) were 
all common themes within the interview data to varying degrees. There are only six 
agencies listed in the following table because the first interview picked up on the themes 
to a limited degree. After the first interview we slightly changed some of the follow up 
questions to better capture themes related to collaborative policy advocacy and social 
capital.  
 As discussed in the theory building section of this paper the elements of social 
capital were proposed as, at least a partial, explanation for why service implementation 
network structures spill over into policy advocacy network structures. One of the most 
widespread elements evidenced by the data was the norm of reciprocity. Agency 
executives gave many examples of their decisions to cooperate with others based on 
reciprocity. For example, one executive gave a very simple answer when she explained 
that she would give information to a partner if he promised to sit on the human rights 
board for two years. Another executive explained that in order to cooperate with others 
one has to be willing to give and that one cannot always expect to “take take take from 
them”. It seems that many of these reciprocated ties led to a development of network 
structure and further cooperation which may have been a predictor of collaborative policy 
advocacy
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Table 5: Quotes exemplifying  elements of social capital which create spillover from service implementation structure  to 
policy advocacy  structure 
Organization Trust  Norms of Reciprocity  Reputation  
Agency that provides services to 
newly released female prisoners 
In the policy and advocacy realm I 
do tend to be a little more 
judicious about who I talk to and 
what I share with them. . . your in 
a setting in which you are trying to 
persuade someone and so the 
information that you provide in 
that context is definitely packaged 
in a way to be persuasive . . . I 
wouldn’t necessarily share all of 
the ramifications of our work 
 
yeah and you know in the context 
of the CSA stuff I was working 
with [. . .] who was the director of 
[TMH] and I don’t know what 
would have come of that but he 
was always um putting out that 
they were not going to let DF fall 
through the cracks so we had a 
good relationship over time. 
 
Agency providing healthcare 
services to  homeless 
 I have this beautiful diagram that I 
made . . . that’s its essentially um 
it identifies who the key partners 
are um who sits at those tables and 
whether they are the primary care 
association that at the state level is 
important. 
 
But we also recognize the 
physicians [in the community] 
their power the reputation and the 
resources that we have in the 
community and so I think that 
even our mission is multi-faceted 
in that it is about services and it is 
also about doing advocacy.  
 
Agency Providing services to 
developmentally disabled 
 that therapist friend who happens 
to be brilliant but he’s not good at 
this stuff it was like I will give 
you this information but I want 
you to serve on the human rights 
committee for two years 
I do feel like we have a good 
reputation as an agency people 
wanna take information a lot so it 
is a matter of sharing 
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Table 5 Continued: Quotes exemplifying  elements of social capital which create spillover from service implementation 
structure  to policy advocacy  structure 
Organization Trust  Norms of Reciprocity  Reputation  
Medium size for-profit mental 
health service provider 
 right and what’s the information 
they are sharing and also is there 
some give and take it’s not fair for 
me to just to take take take from 
them and then they aren’t going to 
want to hang out with me either so 
there has to be some sort of equal 
you have to be on an equal footing 
to some extent 
[Interviewee makes his decisions  
for who to share info with based 
on] yeah you know on one level 
very simple word of mouth 
reputation   
Small nonprofit mental health 
service provider (provides basic 
counseling services) 
Trust is Ok but you just have to 
take it as it can happen or it can’t 
happen it’s nice to have that trust 
that this is something that you can 
do and that it is going to work. 
 They are actually very good 
because well they can’t hold staff 
people can’t work there for very 
long. So anybody who is in mental 
health has worked there sooner or 
later but because they have been 
there forever and they have 
political ties they will be here for a 
long time 
 
Medium sized nonprofit provides 
basic counseling services 
Because everybody is under tight 
resources so everyone is a little 
cautious so everyone asks you 
know what are we expected to 
provide here so I think kinda 
getting past that so you know 
establishing trust and trying to be 
open with one another is. . . easier 
Um so anyway we go out to other 
agencies because we know that we 
don’t have the money to put this 
event on . . . and they have some 
grandparent type functions also so 
we can share resources so and co-
sponsor and do something nice for 
them 
 
Word of mouth and reputation for 
and for me this is what is 
important reputation for actually 
delivering the service for 
following through. 
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Reputation was discussed several times as being important for organizations to 
make the decision to collaborate. Reputation was mentioned in two different ways. The 
first was that organizations felt that their own reputation was important to have the kinds 
of quality ties that where needed to accomplish their goals. For example, one 
organization (the agency that provided services to the developmentally disabled) felt that 
the ties that they had for sharing information where at least partly due to their reputation. 
The second way that reputation was mentioned was that in order to collaborate with other 
organizations they need to know that the other organization was well respected. One 
executive explained his organization’s collaboration was based on “very simple word of 
mouth reputation”. This serves as further evidence that relationships that are built based 
on reputation in a service implementation network may lead to relationships of policy 
advocacy.  
Trust, the last part of social capital that was studied, turned out to be an important 
piece of policy advocacy structure. This is consistent with Lambright et al. (2010)’s 
findings which noted that trust is important in networks because network cooperation is 
based upon interdependence and there are fewer hierarchical relations which ensure 
continued cooperation. One example of this came from the executive whose organization 
provides services to newly released female prisoners when she stated that “in the policy 
and advocacy realm I do tend to be a little more judicious about who I talk to and what I 
share with them”. These sentiments were echoed by others who felt that it was important 
to be cautious about who they shared information with when it came to advocacy. 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 To tie the information together that has been brought to bear so far it is best to 
think of this study from the bottom up approach that Enroth (2011) conceptualized for 
policy networks. First, in the context of this study, networks can be envisioned as a set of 
individuals that have come together to implement a service or to advocate. The decision 
to collaborate may have been made based on unilateral concerns or may have been 
spurred on by the State and the NAO. The individual wills group together based on 
similar sets of circumstances. These groups can be aggregated into networks as long as 
their interactions can be described as a web of interdependencies. In the policy advocacy 
network under study much of the dyadic interactions which form the structure of the 
network may have been developed in the service implementation network. Many of these 
interactions were based on the elements of social capital including trust, norms of 
reciprocity and reputation. Some of these interactions, which can be aggregated into 
network structures, may have spilled over to create structures of policy advocacy.  
 The proposed model in this research seeks to explain a portion of a process that 
was observed at the time the surveys and the interviews were conducted. Taken together, 
the observed decrease in centrality from service implementation networks to policy 
advocacy networks, the observed linear relationship between their embeddedness in 
clique structures, and the qualitative findings pointing to possible explanations for why 
and how service implementation networks spilled over into policy advocacy network 
structures—leads us to an overarching conclusion about the observed relationships. First, 
the seeds of policy advocacy network structure most likely emanate from the desire to 
provide services to the mentally ill. Second, this desire probably resulted in the 
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development of service implementation networks based on interdependencies. Being that 
the service implementation network is not perfect and since it is governed and largely 
funded by the state a need to advocate was developed. The need to advocate resulted in 
networks of policy advocacy where some of the structure of the network carried over 
from the service implementation networks while the rest of the structure emanated from 
other arenas that were not captured by our data.          
At this point it is important to note that this model is not an all-encompassing 
model. It seeks to expand on a chunk of real estate in the policy and advocacy realm. 
There are other factors that contribute to policy advocacy that are not being explored in 
this study. Those factors may be a good area for further research. This research seeks to 
add to the growing body of knowledge on interorganizational relationships taking a 
bottom up approach. It is bound by many of the limitations that network researchers (and 
researchers in general) often face. First, it does not take into account the temporal 
dynamics which can be so insightful when it comes to testing whether one network 
structure leads to another. Second, while the surveyed sample was very close to the target 
population, the size of the sample was relatively small. Last, the generalizability of the 
study may be limited because it seeks to explain network dynamics within a relatively 
unique set of circumstances. Namely, the networks of inquiry and their bounds were 
determined by a central authority (the NAO), most of the networks were centrally 
governed by the NAO, and the network was in a state of turbulence at the time of the 
sample.        
 What this research does is points us in the direction of developing a more 
complete theory of the origins of policy advocacy networks and gives us some insight 
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into the relations that organizations have. It gives us further insight into the idea that, 
while two organizations may cooperate to provide a service, they may not cooperate in 
other realms. Their cooperation may be limited by things like trust, reciprocity, and 
reputation. While those three factors limit interaction on one hand (in their absence 
organizations are less likely to engage in relationships) they can enhance interaction on 
the other. More research is required to understand these relationships more fully. 
 This research does have practical applications as well. For example, the results of 
hypothesis 2, finding a negative relationship between membership in a clique with the 
NAO and policy advocacy, when tested separately generated several possible dynamics 
that are worth discussing. The first of these dynamics was that it may be that the NAO is 
serving as a “big brother” in cliques where the NAO is a member. The observation in 
hypothesis 2 may be evidence that the NAO is influencing organizations not to 
collaborate in dyadic relationships of policy advocacy with other members in their 
respective cliques. Furthermore, the NAO may have a vested interest in keeping 
internetwork policy advocacy to a minimum and maintaining collaborations at the service 
delivery level. A strategy that smaller organizations may be advised to take would be to 
counteract the asymmetrical power of the NAO by creating advocacy alliances with other 
organizations in the network who have similar dependence. If the NAO is playing a “big 
brother” role within service delivery cliques it is advisable not to allow the NAO to 
divide and conquer. Organizations may, in this regard, be able to garner more resources 
from their environment. 
 Another dynamic that may be present is that the NAO connected organizations 
may have reduced levels of trust within the network. One possible explanation for the 
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negative relationship between NAO Clique Co-membership (Sharing Information) and 
policy advocacy is that if organization X and Y are in a clique with organization Z (the 
NAO) it may be that organization X does not trust Y simply because X has witnessed the 
relationship between Y and Z. It may be true that network members distrust the NAO to 
such a degree that they are concerned with perceived relationships between Y and Z. If 
this is the case, it may be advisable for the NAO to try to develop relationships of trust so 
that smaller organizations within the network do not have a reason to try to counteract the 
power of the NAO.  
 The last dynamic comes from the supporting evidence for hypothesis 3. H3: posits 
a relationship between NAO clique co-membership and similar dependence on the NAO 
on one hand and engagement in policy advocacy on the other. As stated above it may be 
advisable for organizations with similar dependencies on the NAO to create alliances to 
counteract the power of the NAO. The results of the analysis provide some evidence that 
this might already be happening to a certain degree. The variable which tested similar 
dependence multiplied by NAO Clique Co-membership provides evidence for this. As 
discussed in the quantitative findings section certain organizations that have similar 
dependence on the NAO and share a clique with the NAO are more likely to engage in 
dyadic relationships of policy advocacy. Outside the scope of this study is the content of 
these interactions. One can imagine that some organizations are making alliances with 
other similarly situated organizations to counteract the asymmetrical power of the NAO. 
This is only one explanation for this observation. Other organizations may be working 
with the NAO for the purposes of service implementation and policy advocacy. This is 
speculation but may be an interesting area for further research. 
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This research contributes to theory in one major way. Borgatti and Halgin 
(2011)’s bonding theory stated that organizations will bond together to create ties of 
solidarity. Their work reports that peripheral organizations will bond together for the 
purposes of counteracting the power of a larger organization. This research provides 
some evidence that this happens but only under certain conditions. For example, NAO 
clique co-membership was negatively related to the possibility that organizations will 
engage in dyadic relations of policy advocacy. Furthermore, when NAO similar 
dependence was taken by itself the results were found to have no statistically significant 
impact. When these two factors were taken together there was evidence that they 
positively influenced policy advocacy. This is important because it shows that 
organizations will only bond together to counteract a more powerful actor under certain 
conditions. Other conditions may discourage organizations from bonding.     
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